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Although  much  discussed  in  both  the  economic  and  banking
literature,  the  lender  of  last  resort  has  always  been  a  vague
concept.  Apparentl-y  first  discussed  by  Sir  Francis  Baring  in
1-797  and  refined  by  Henry  Thornton  (1802)  and  Walter  Bagehot
(1873),  among others,  the  lender  of  last  resortrs  function  was to
prevent  financial  panics  and  crises  from  being  ignited  by
problems  at  individual  institutions  or  markets. This  has
generally  been  interpreted  as  preventing  the  individual  problern
from  causj-ng  a  decline  in  the  aggregate  money  supply.  For
example,  Thomas  Hunphrey  begins  his  recent  historical  review  of
the  lender  of  last  resort  with  the  statement:
Averting  banking  panics  and  crises  is  the  job  of  the
central  bank.  As  Lender  of  last  resort  (LLR),  it  has
the  responsibility  of  preventing  panic-induced
coLlapses  of  the  noney  supply.r
But  concern  over  collapse  of  the  rnoney  suppJ.y  has  not  been
very  great,  at  l-east  in  the  United  States,  since  1933,  fn  part,
this  reflects  the  introduction  of  federal  deposit  insurance,
Nevertheless,  lender  of  last  resort  assistance  has  been  provided
*This  paper  was  started  when  the  author  was  visiting
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1.  Thomas M,  Hunphrey,  rlender  of  Last  Resort:  The
Concept  in  History,'r  Economic  Review  (Federal  Reserve  Bank
of  Richmond),  March/ApriL  l-989, p.  8.by  the  Federal  Reserve  o.,  .  ,rrrl*"r  of  occasions,  including  the
Penn  Central  failure  in  1970,  the  Continental  lllinois  fail-ure  in
1984,  the  Bank  of  New  york  conputer  failure  in  1995,  the  Ohio
Thrift  Crisis  in  1,996, the  Texas  bank  failures  in  19g7-L988,  the
potential  Bank  of  Nevr Engl-and  failure  in  1990,  and  the  stock
market  crashes  of  October  19BZ and  October  L989.  Of  these,  only
the  fail-ure  of  the  Continental-  TLlinois  Bank  should  have  been
perceived  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to  potentially  inpact  the  supply
of  noney.  The  other  events  represented  shocks  that  threatened
the  so]vency  of  large  banks  or  that  irnposed  abrupt  reductions  in
wealth  in  the  nonbank  sectors  dj_rectLy  involved  and  that  $/ere
perceived  to  threaten  sirnilar  r^realth  reductions  in  other  sectors
and  thus  threaten  to  reduce  aggregate  income  in  the  economy.
Thus,  potential  reductions  in  the  aggregate  noney  suppfy  no
longer  appear  to  be  the  prirnary.  rationale  for  lender  of  last
resort  intervention,  This  paper  reviews  the  theory  of  the  lender
of  last  resort,  discusses  its  uses  through  time,  and  analyzes  its
applicability  to  current  problems.
The  theory  of  the  lender  of  last  resort  was  developed  for
econoraies  in  Lrhich  the  rnoney supply  was primarj-Iy  specie  or  paper
notes  freely  converted  into  specie.  These  econornies  were
extrenely  sensitive  to  exogenous  disturbances  from  internal  and
external  sources.  LLR operations  were  viewed  as  temporary  with
only  short-tern  effects  and  were  differentiated  frorn  continuinq3
central  bank  operations  to  affect  income,  emplolnnent,  and  the
price  leve}  in  the  longer-terrn.  To  borrolr  current  Federal
Reserve  terninology,  LLR  hrere  rdefensiverr  operations  rather  than
rrdynamicrr operations.
When  specie  was  drained  from  the  system  because  of,  say,  an
outflow  to  forei-gn  countries  (external  source)  or  an  outflow  frorn
the  banks  into  private  hands  (internal  source)  a  rnultiple
contraction  in  note  issue  occurred.  By  restricting  dornestic
trade,  in  the  absence  of  sufficiently  flexible  prices,  such
contractions  would  have  adverse  effects  on  levels  of  real
activity  in  a1I  sectors  of  the  economy.  Thus,  it  would  be
efficient  for  a  government  agency,  such  as  a  central  bank,  to
naintain  a  stock  of  specie  sufficiently  large  to  inject  into  the
economy to  prevent  the  contraction.  The  LLR was  seen  as  ensuring
that  the  aggregate  econorny  was  irnmuni-zed  fron  the  ad.verse  effects
of  the  initial  event  causing  the  specie  drain,  at  least  as  it
wouLd  be  transmitted  through  decreases  in  the  money  supply,
According  to  Bagehot,  external  drains  can  be  stopped  prinarily  by
raising  interest  rates  sufficiently.  On the  other  hand,  dornestic
drains  can  be  stopped  by  1ending  freeLy:
A.panic,  in  a word,  is  a  species  of  neuralgia,  and
according  to  the  rules  of  science  you  nust  no{  starve
it.  The  holders  of  the  cash  reserve  must  be  ready  not
olly  to  .keep  it  for  their  own  Iiabilities,  fui  to
advance  j.t  most  freely  for  the  liabil_ities  oi  others.
They  nust  lend  to  merchants,  to  minor  bankers,  tor  this
man  and  that  man, r  v/henever  the  security  j_s  good.  In
wiLd  periods  of  alarrn,  one  failure  nakeJ  manyl  and  the
best  way  to  prevent  the  derivative  failuies  is  to
arrest  the  prinary  failure  which  causes  then....  The4
problen  of  nanaging  a  panic  must  not  be  thought  of  as
ruainly  -  a  rrbankingtt  problern.  It  is  priirarily  a
nercantile  one. ..
There  should  be  a  cl-ear  understanding  between  the
B?lI  (of_  England)  and  the  public...  that  they  (sic)
!ril-J"  replenish  it  j_n tines  of  foreign  demand aJ  titly,
and  lend  it  in  tirnes  of  j-nternal  panic  as  freelv  aird
readily,  as  plain  principles  of  baniing  requiyg.2 
'
A  number  of  observations  follor.r  from  these  statemenrs.
Externar  and  internal  sources  of  disturbances  have  different
implications.  By  reducing  specie,  external  disturbances  wiIl  of
necessity  reduce  the  money  suppJ.y  and  need  to  be  offset  by  an
equal  injection  of  specie  into  the  economy  by  the  LLR  either
directly  or  indirectly  by  increasing  interest  rates  and
attracting  species  from  abroad  in  order  to  prevent  spill-over  to
the  economy  as  a  whole.  Internal  disturbances,  however,  may  or
may  not  resuLt  in  an  increase  in  the  denand  for  specie  and.  a
decLine  in  the  rnoney  supply.  Thus,  naintenance  of  the  noney
supply  does  not  appear  to  be  the  sole  objective.  Rather,  the  LLR
should  inject  whatever  specie  necessary  to  relieve.  the  panic  and
prevent  additional  business  faiLures.  This  injection  can  be
through  banks  or  in  direct  transactions  with  whoever  has  rgoodrl
security.  Good  apparently  refers  to  security  whose  equilibriurn
narket  value  is  not  less  than  the  assistance  provided  by  the  LLR,
but  whose  instantaneous  market  value  may  be  ternporarily  lower  as
a  result  of  potential  trfire-sale  losses.  That  is.  for  internal
shocks,  the  LLR  shoul_d  lend  freely  to  curb  short-run  liguidity
2.  Walter  Bagehot,  Lonbard  Street  (11th  Ed.)  (Londont
Kegan,  Paul ,  Trench,  Trubner  & Co,,  LS94).  pp.  53,54,73.J
problems  that  are  independent  of  underlying  equilibrium  solvency
problerns.  This  rule  is  considerably  broader  than  preventing  a
collapse  of  the  money  supply  per  se  and  appears  to  focus  nore
directly  on  preventing  a  tenporary  collapse  of  incorne  regardless
of  ho$r the  shock  is  transmitted.3
Thus,  the  second  sentence  of  Humphrey, s  statement  1inits  the
role  of  the  LLR  to  a  greater  extent  than  envisioned  by  Bagehot.
ff  this  is  so,  and  the  quantity  of  money  cannot  be  viewed  as  a
criterion,  s/hat  rules  should  guide  LLR operations?  The  renainder
of  this  paper  discusses  such  potentiat  guidelines.
To  analyze  potential  guidelines,  it  is  necessary  to  consj-der
a  number  of  questions:
1.  what  constitutes  a  panic  or  crisis?
3.  Bagehot  does  not  differentiate  clearly  between  lending
on  good  security  and  lending  to  good  borrowers.  He  notes  that rrno  advances  indeed  need  be  made  by  which  the  Bank  will
ultimately  lose.rr  (p.  2oo)  But  insolve;t  j.nstitutions  generally
do  .ho1d.  some  good  assets,  or  assets  that  have  a 
-positive
equilibriurn  rnarket  val-ue.  A  few  lines  later  he  states  tiat  "the najority  to  be  protected,  are  the  ,sound,  people,  the  peopLe  who
have  .good.  security  to  offer."  The  Federal  Reserve  uiuall.ly
restricts  its  lending  to  banks  that  are  not  declared  insotvent  by
their  chartering  authority,  But,  as  de:nonstrated  in  the
Continental,  Illinois,  First  Republic,  and  other  large  bank  cases
in  recent  years,  solvent  is  an 
-elastic 
term.  NearLy  all  of  these
banks  lJere  insoLvent  on  an  econornic  or  market  value  basis.
although  not  on  a  book  value  basis  and  thus  were  not  declared
insolvent  by  their  chartering  aqency  for  sorne tirne.  As  discussed
later.  in  the  paper,  the  use  of  open  rnarket  operations  rather  than
the  discount  window  perrnits  ttre  f..,f,R  to  escap!  this  dilernrna,
Durinq  the  Ohio  S&I-,  crisis  of  j.995,  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank
of  Cleveland  did  lend  to  insolvent  institutions  on  a
collateralized  basis.  The  credit  l,ras extended  rfor  the  purpose
of  facilitating  an  orderly  closing  or  merger  of  the  institulion
[and]...  the  indebtedness  [hrould]...  be  assumed,  or  repaid,  by  a
legal  successor  of  the  insolvent  institutj.on.  "  f'ederil  Reserve
Bank  of  cleveland,  AnnuaL  Report,  19.!!g (CleveLand,  OH),  pg.  22.3.
4.
l)
Hon  may  individuaL  shocks  be  transmitted  into  broader
shocks  representing  crisis  or  panics?
How can  the  LLR interdict  this  transnission  process  or
contagion?
What  are  the  costs,  if  any,  of  such  interdiction  and
how  can  the  LLR  evaluate  whether  assistance  should  be
provided?
Ilow should  the  LLR provide  the  necessary  funding?
Reserve:  tender  of  L  (  Carnbridge,  MA.
Press,  L988),  p,  9.
5.  Alternatively,  Anna  Schwartz  has  defined
crisis  rnore  restrictivelv  as  one:
The  Federal
:  Ball  inger
a  financial
What Constitutes  a  panic  or  Crisis?
As Garcia  and plautz  note,  rthere  is  no general  agreenent  on
what  constitutes  a  crisis.,4  webster,s  Dictionary  defines  crisis
as  a  ti-ne  itat  which  the  business  organisrn  is  severely  strained
and  forced  liquidation  occurs.,  Likewise,  a  financial  panic  is
defined  as  a  ,rsudden  widespread  fright  concerning  financial
affairs  and  resulting  in  a  depression  in  values  caused by...  the
saLe  of  securities  or  other  properties.rr  The  key  word  in  this
def i-nition  is  'sudden'.  This  implies  the  potential  for  sudden or
abrupt  J-iquidations  and  tenporary  or  fire-sale  losses  resulting
in  the  destruction  of  reaL  wealth  that  woul-d not  occur,  or  at
least  not  to  the  sane  extent,  if  there  was grreater  tine.  That
is,  a  financial  crisis  or  panic  exists  when there  is  a  liquidity
problen  in  one  or  more  inportant  sector  of  the
econonv. 5
Gillian  Garcia  and  Elizabeth  plautz,Correct  j.ng  a liquidity  probLem  does  not  irnpJ.y  that
eguilibriurn  asset  prices  may  not  decline,  but  onty  that  narket
prices  do  not  decline  so  abruptly  that  there  is  insufficient  tirne
to  conduct  an  efficient  search  for  the  highest  bidder.  Thus,  for
example,  although  both  are  likel_y  to  produce  fire-sale  losses,
the  sudden  appearance  of  an  adverse  runor  that  is  subsequential  J-y
identified  as  unfounded  woutd  not  be  expected  to  depress
eguilibriun  asset  values,  while  a  sudden  and  unexpected  military
invasion  or  oil  embargo  may.  Fire-sale  reductions  in  asseE
prices  are  of  concern  to  the  LtR  if  they  are  sufficiently
inportant  in  themselves  to  ternporarily  reduce  aqgregate  real
incorne  significantly,  even  only  temporarj-ly,  or  if  they  threaten
to  spi1l  over  to  other  important  sectors.  How  nay  widespread
fire-sale  losses  arise?
Numerous  types  of  shocks  can  cause  a  sudden  reeval_uation  of
asset  prices  either  up  or  down.  Some shocks  are  applicable  to
one  or  a  very  linited  nurnber  of  assets,  others  may  impact  prices
of  a  broad  array  of  assets.  As  discussed  earlier,  sone  shocks
may  cause  only  temporary  eguilibriurn  displacements  of  asset
prices  and  others  a  more  lasting  shift  in  prices.  In  either
fueled  by  fears  that  means of  paynent  will  be  unobtainable
at  any  prj-ce  and...Ieads  to  a  scramble  for  high-powered
money,  is  precipitated  by  actions  of  the  public  that
suddenly  squeeze  the  reserves  in  ttre  bankingr  system,.,.
landl  i.s  short-lived,  ending  with  a  sl.ackening  of  the
public's  denand for  additional  currency.
Anna  J,  Sche/artz,  "Rea1  and  pseudo-Financial  Crisesrl in  Forrest
the  world Capie  and  Geoffrey  E.  Wood,  eds.  Financial  Crises  and
Bankinq  Svsten  (New yorkt  st.  Martin,s  press),  1986 p. 11.case,  in  perfect  markets,  the  assets  to  which  the  shock  applies
would  attain  their  new  post  reevafuation  prices  inmediately  and
without  the  need  for  any  transactions  (sales).  But  narkets  are
not  perfect  and  some asset  owners nay  wish  to  se1l  their  assets
irnrnediately  upon  observing  the  shock.  The  prices  at  which  they
can  se11  these  assets  depends on  the  liquidity  of  the  particular
market.
L,iquidity  nay  be  defined  as  the  costs  involved,  including
time,  in  searching  out  the  potentially  highest  bidders  and  the
underlying  equilibriurn  price.  The  greater  the  costs,  the  less
liquid  the  narket.  Liguidity  varies  with  the  characteristics  of
the  asset  traded.  The  nore  unique  the  asset,  the  snaller  the
voLume outstanding,  and  smaller  the  daily  trading  volune,  the
less  liquid  the  market  and the  greater  and  longer  will  fire-sale
prices  be  incurred.  (Because  prices  and  interest  rates  are
inversely  related,  fire-saLe  prices  imply  interest  rate  spikes
for  these  assets. )  Thus,  liguidity  rnay be  expected  to  differ
across  markets  and,  for  any  given  tirne  interval  after  a  shock,
fire-sale  losses  will  differ  fron  market  to  narket.
But  even  in  the  most  liquid  narkets,  sudden  changes  in
perceived  prices  by  a  sufficiently  large  nuntrer of  participancs,
because  of,  sdyr  sudden  new  information,  can  produce  fire-sale
prj-ces,  In  part,  this  reflects  both  technological  restrictions
on  trade  irnposed  by  the  extant  rnechanics  of  consunnating  trades
on  the  particular  market  and  the  minirnum amount  of  time  necessary
for  market  participants  to  reassess  their  strategies  in9
consideration  of  the  new  information  and  pl.ace  new buy  or  sell
orders.  These  factors  appear  to  have  been  tbe  rnajor  causes  of
the  fire-sale  prices  acconpanying  the  breaks  in  the  stock  and
derivative  markets  in  October  L9AT  and  1989,  among  the  rnost
liquid  of  a}l  rnarkecs.
Both  matching  buyers  and  sellers  and  reassessing  stracegy
require  finite  tine,  although  both  are  greatly  affected  by  the
technology  availabLe.  The  nore  advanced  the  technoloqy,  the
brj,efer  the  rnininum  time  period  required.  Thus,  Iiquidity  is
Largely  a technological  characteristic  and reflects  the  potential
for  a  temporary  rnisnatching  of  supply  and  denand  in  a  particular
market  or  across  markets.  For  a  give  state  of  technology  and
Iiquidity,  the  greater  the  shock,  the  greater  nay  be expected  the
resulting  volune  of  transactions  and  the  nagnitude  of  fire-saLe
losses.  LLR intervention  cannot  affect  the  state  of  technology,
but  can  offset  its  adverse  implications  by  effectively  providing
additional  time  through  stirnulating  denand.
Reassessing  portfolio  strategies  by  market  participants  in
the  wake  of  an  adverse  shock  and  new  information  is  1ikely  to  be
nore  difficult  and  time  consuming  for  securities  subject  to
default  risk  than  for  defauLt-free  securitj,es,  such  as  U.S.
Treasury  securities,  At  such  tirnes,  there  is  also  a  likelihood
of  an  inmediate  flight  to  quality  as  some rnarket  participants
would  rather  be  safe  than  sorry.  This  should  worsen  the
liquidity  problen  for  nondefault-free  securities  and  j_mprove thern
for  default-free  securities.  Indeed,  prices  may even  rise  and10
interest  rates  decline  for  default-free  securities.
It  follows  that  the  nore  liquid  a  narket,  the  briefer  wiII
fire-sale  prices  be,  the  Less  wi1l"  wealth  be  reduced  in  the
sector,  the  less  are  such  prices  likely  to  affect  other  narkets
and  sectors,  and  the  fess  is  the  need  for  support  from  the  LLR.
The  role  of  the  LLR  is  thus  to  provide  liquidity  tenporarily  when
market  failure  causes  it  to  dry  up.  Both  theory  and  evidence
suggest  that  the  LLR,  or  any  other  nonetary  assistance,  cannot
increase  reaL  incorne  for  extended  periods  of  tine  and,  therefore,
should  not  be  provided  to  attempt  to  offset  Lasting  real  rncone
decl,ines  frorn  the  initial  shocks.
As  financial  markets  have  becone  broader  and  the  volurne  of
transactions  has  increased,  the  xnechanisms  for  providing
Iiguidity  have  also  irnproved  so  that  fire-sa1e  fosses  on
particular  markets  from  shocks  of  the  sarne  rnagnitude  should  be
snaller  and  shorter-Iived  than  earlier.  Markets  have  become nore
efficient.  However,  at  the  same  time,  i.nnovations  in  computer
and  tel,ecornmuni.cations  technology  have  increased  both  the  speed
at  which  transactions  rnay  be  consunmated  and  the  volurne  of
transactions  that  may  be  conducted.  This  has  increased  the
potential  for  abrupt  price  changes  and  fire-saIe  losses  ].n
response  to  shocks.  That  is,  there  has  been  a  race  bet$/een
advances  in  technology  that  have  irnproved  the  mechanisnr  for
provJ.ding  liquidity  and  advances  in  technology  that  have
encouraged  increases  in  transaction  volume.  The  net  effect  on
liquidity  and  the  potential  for  the  rnagnitude  and  length  of  fire-11
sale  losses  is  uncertain,
The Transmission  of  Shocks
In  evaluating  whether  a  particular  figuidity  problen  is
sufficiently  severe  to  warrant  assistance,  the  LLR  neeits  to
consider  whether  the  effects  will  be  restricted  to  the  particular
sector  directly  inpacted  by  the  shock or  will  spil1  over  to  other
sectors.  This  requires  knowledge  of  the  processes  by  which
shocks  may be  transmitted  from  sector  to  sector.
Assume  an  initial  exogenous  shock  that  lowers  some  asset
prices  and  thereby  reduces  wealth  in  a  particular  sector.  The
most  obvious  transrnj.ssion  J-  j.nkage  is  through  changes  in  the  money
supply. As  noted  earli.er,  this  channel  is  the  focus  of  manv
anarysis  of  LLR activities.  However,  in  a rnodern economy wi-thout
specie  based  raoney, a  collapse  of  the  noney  supply  for  reasons
other  than  central  bank  actions  can  cone  about  only  through  an
increase  in  currency  fron  a  run  on  the  banking  systern  as  a  whole.
Runs  or  deposit  outflows  frorn  individual  banks  in  the  pursuit  of
safety  are  likely  only  to  reshuffle  reselves  and deposits  within
the  bankingr  system. The  fleeing  funds  are  l1keJ_y  to  be
redeposited  directly  at  otherf  perceived  safe  banks  or  indirectly
through  a  fl  ight-to-qual  ity  that  first  involves  the  purchase  of
nonbank,  conpleteLy  secure  securj-ties,  such  as  Treasury
securities,  and then  a  redeposit  of  the  proceeds  by  the  selLer  of
the  securities  in  a  safe  bank.  No reserves  or  noney  supply  are
lost  to  the  system  as  a  whole  in  either  scenario,  even  ifL2
deposits  are  transferred  to  banks  overseas,  and thus  the  cost  of
the  runs  is  likely  to  be  relatively  rnininal .6  n1l  runs  wil,l
increase  churning  and  uncertainty  and,  at  least,  tenporarily
disturb  customer  -  bank  relationships.  In  addition,  runs  to
foreign  currencies  wilf  affect  exchange rates.
Indirect  redeposits  do  cause  more  inportant  interest  rate
effects  as  rates  on  public  securities  are  bid  do$rn and  those  on
private  securities  are  bid  up  and possibLe  exchange rate  effects
if  deposits  are  transferred  to  banks  overseas.  OnLy if  neither
the  initial  depositors  nor  the  seLlers  of  the  safe  securities
perceive  any  bank  in  the  country  or  in  other  countries  as  weII  to
be  safe  and  s/ish  to  hold  currency  outside  the  banking  syste:n  is
the  aggregate  supply  of  money  affected.  Such  a  run  reduces
aggregate  bank  reserves  and,  unless  offset  by  an  equal  injection
of  reserves  by  the  central  bank,  ignites  a  rnultiple  contraction
of  noney and credit.
The  reduction  in  the  aggregate  noney  supply  will  cause  the
inpact  of  the  shock  to  spread  out  to  other  sectors  of  the  economy
and,  if  prices  are  not  perfectly  flexible,  wil]  reduce  real  as
welf  as  noninal  incorne.  But,  as  discussed  earlier,  in  the
6.  George  J.  Benston,  Robert  A.  Eisenbeis,  paul  M.  Horvitz,
Edward  J.  Xane,  and  George  c.  Kaufman,  perspectives  on  Safe  and
Sound  Bankinq  (Cambridge,  liIA:  MIT  press)  ,  f96A,  Chapter  Zi  Oeorge
G,  Kaufman  rrBank Runs:  Causes,  Benefits  and  Costsr  CATO  Journai,
Winter  1989,  pp.  559-598t  and  Anna  J.  Schwartz,  ,,The  Lender  of
Last  Resort  and  the  Federal  Safety  Net'r  Journal  of  Financial
Services  Research,  Septenber  tSeZ,  pp.  t-te.  For  a  contrary  view
see  Lawrence  H.  Sunmers,  rplanning  For  the  Next  Finlncial
Crisis,  t. Working  Paper,  Harvard  Univeisity  and  National  Bureau  of
Economic  Research,  October  17,  LgBg.13
Fresence  of  both  federal  deposit  insurance  that  guarantees
snaller  depositors  the  full  par  value  of  their  deposits
regardless  of  the  financial  solvency  of  their  bank  and  a  hrell-
inforned  centraL  bank  that  nay  be  assumed  to  have  learned  from
its  nistakes  of  the  l-930s,  it  is  highly  unlikeLy  that  a  shock
will  result  in  a  currency  run  on  the  banking  systen  and  cause  a
reduction  in  aggregate  money.T  llarger  depositors  cannot  conduct
their  operations  efficientty  with  currency  and  are  thus  unlikely
to  convert  from  deposits  to  currency,)  That  is,  federal  deposit
insurance  has  made  the  centrar  bank  as  a  LLR  redundant  for  shocks
transnitted  through  reductions  in  rnoney supply,S
But  contagion  may  occur  through  other  channels,  Shocks  that
reduce  wealth  in  a  particular  sector  by  reducing  asset  prices  in
that  sector  may  cause  defauLts  by  debtors  in  that  sector,
Anna  Schwartz  notes  that  bank  runs  have  been  far  Iess
frequent  in  U,S.  history  than  bank  failures  and  that  few  runs
have  1ed  to  failures.  For  exarnpl-e,  the  comptroller  of  the
currency  attributes  only  16 of  the  353 failures  of  national  banks
between  192L  and  L925  to  runs.  Anna  J.  Schwartz,  rFj_nancial
stability  and  the  Federal  safety  Net.  in  will-iarn  Haraf  and  Rose
Marie  Kushmeider,  eds.,  Restructurinq  Bankincr  and  Financi.al gervices  in  Anerica  lWasnin
Institute,  t 9B8)  ,  pp.  34-62.
-  8,  A  particularly  interesting  exanple  of  deposit  insurance
dorninance  of  the  central  bank  in  providing  LLR asiistance  is  the
Canadian  experience  of  the  L93o;.  It  is  likely  that  aI1  or
nearl'y  all  canadian  conrnercial  banks  $rere econonicarry  insorvent
in  this  period.  yet,  there  were  no  legaI  bank  failuies  or  bank
runs  into  currency  as  there  were  in  the  U.S.  This  appears  to
have  been  the  resuLt  of  an  irnplicit  but  r^ridely  recognlzed  100
percent  depos it  guarantee  by  the  federaL  governnent.
Interestingly,  there  was  neither  explicit  fedefal  deposit
lnsurance  nor  a  central  bank.  Lawrence  Kryzanowski  and  Gordon  S.
Roberts,  frThe Performance  of  Canadian  Banking  System:  Lg2e-:-94On
in  Fanhing.svsten  Risk:  Charterincr  a Nen coursa  (Federal  Reserve
Bank of  Chicago)  ,  !989,  pp.  2Z!-23r.14
particularly  where  the  debt  is  colLateralized  by  assets  whose
prices  have  declined.  Such defaults  are  nost  Likely  to  occur  in
clearing  payments  for  recent  transactions  on  cash  and  options
markets  and  on  daily  nark-to-rnarket  adj ustnents  on  futures
positions.  The  defaults  will  cause  a  redistribution  of  wealth
frorn  creditors,  who  do  not  receive  paynents  owed  in  full,  to
debtors,  who do  not  make paynents  owed in  fuLl,  but  not  a  direct
reduction  in  real  wealth.9  Hohrever, the  defaurts  rnay ignite  a
chain  of  successive  defaurts  as  unpaid  creditors  nay  default  on
their  debts  to  others,  and  so  on,  and  may increase  default  risk
prerniuns  on  bonds.  As  a  resul-t,  the  decline  in  asset  prices  may
spread  to  other  sectors .
The  losses  from  defaults,  however,  nay  be  expected  to  be
substantially  less  than  the  value  of  the  debt.  They srould only
be  equal.  to  the  difference  between  the  amount  ov/ed and  the  fire-
sale  vaLue  of  the  underlying  security.  Moreover,  the  Ioss  of
primary  concern  to  the  LLR wourd  be  only  the  difference  between
the  fire-sale  vaLue  of  the  security  and  its  new,  l-ower
eguiribriun  price.  The  LLR can  assume either  the  fu1l  defaurt
l-oss  fron  the  initial  shock  or  the  fire-sale  Ioss  by  purchasing
the  securities  either  at  the  last  before-shock  price  or  the
estirnated  new  equilibriurn  price,  respectively,  or  by  lending
amounts  equal  to  either  price  and  holding  the  securitj-es  as
9,  Bernanke  and  certler  argue  that  such
can  directly  impact  real  income  adversel-v. r,rrpd(; L  -f  ea-L  J-ncome  aqversgl-y  . ItFi-nancial  Structure  and  Economic  activitv:
a  redistribution
See  Mark  certler
An  Overvierr/,  rl
1988),  Pt.  2,  pp.
559-588.l-3
collateral  .  These  transactions  nay  be  with  either  the  debtors  or
creditors  directly  or  vrith  the  clearing  facility.10
It  is  inportant  to  note  that  defaults  do  not  necessarily
decrease  aggregate  credit  per  se.  If  the  creditor  is  a  bank,  a
default  wourd  reduce  the  institutionrs  income  and  net  worth  but
not  its  reserves  and  therefore  not  its  ability  to  repLace  the
extinguished  loan.  Indeed,  even  if  the  bank  were  driven  into
insolvency  as  a  result  of  the  default,  aggregate  reserves  in  the
banking  systen  rernain  unchanged.  The  credit  expansion  potential
is  transferred  to  other  solvent  banks,  rf  the  initial  shock
reduced  wearth  sufficiently,  the  dernand for  credit  rnay be  reduced
and  aggregate  credit  wirr  decrine.  But  offsetting  this  reduction
is  outside  the  scope  of  LLR intervention.
The  Federat  Reserve  has  also  provided  extended  LLR
assi-stance  through  the  discount  lrindow  to  large  couunerciar  banks
experiencing  more  solvency  problens  than  Iiquidity  prob1erns.11
Among  others,  these  banks  included  the  Frankrin  NationaL  Bank
(1974),  the  Continental  Illinois  Bank  (L994),  The  First  Republic
Bank  (1987),  M Corp  (1988),  and  Bank of  New England  (1990).  The
justification  for  such  lending  is  rnore  difficult  to  classify.
Although  officially  justified  each  tirne  by  the  .rtoo  large  ro
10.  Direct  temporar)r  shocks  to
to  technological  or  power  breakdowns,
York  computer  failure  (1985),  can
f ramerdork.
1.1,.  Indeed,  sone  cynics  might  argue  that  the  best  early
cause  of  a  large  bankrs  economic  insolvency  is  extended  energency
borrowing  from  the  FederaL  Reserve.
the  clearing  facility,  due
such  as  in  the  Bank  of  New
be  analyzed  in  a  sirnilar16
fail-tt  doctrine,  onr-y  the  continentar  rr-rinois  Bank  failure  may,
at  the  time,  have  been  perceived  capable  of  igniting  a  currency
run  on  the  banking  system  and  a  progressive  series  of  defaults
frorn  losses  to  correspondent  banks.12  Ex-post,  neither  fear  was
justified.  Nor  were  the  shocks  to  the  banks  so  sudden  that  they
caused  rnassive  fire-sate  losses  nor  so  large  that  they  directly
reduced  wealth  sufficiently  to  impact  aggregate  incone  or
increase  risk  premiums  on  healthy  banks  and  cause  fire-sa1e
losses  there.
It  appears  that  such  LLR assistance  was motivated  jointty  by
an  atnosphere  of  camaraderie  with  feLlow  rbankers[,  desire  to
Itbuy[  time  to  work  out  a  solution,  knowledge  that  the  loans  are
ful-Iy  collateralized  by  sorneone else--  the  FDIC,  and/ or  failure
to  understand  fully  the  nature  of  the  problen.  In  the  v/ords  of
Anna  Schwartz,  The  Fed  has  confused  rrfinancial  distressrr  with
"financial  gri.i.tr.13  fn  such  assistance,  the  Federal  Reserve
L2.  George  c.  Kaufman,  [Are  Sone  Banks  Too  Large  To  Fail?
Myth  and  Reality,  "  Contemporarv  policy  Issues  (forthcohing).  For
a  defense  of  assisting  insolvent  banks,  see  Charles  Goodhirt,  The
Evolution  of  central  Banks  (London:  London  school  of  Econornics
and  Political  Science)  ,  l_985,
13.  Schwartz,  rrReaL and  pseudo  -  Financial  Crisesrr ,  pp,  25-
28.  For  sirnilar  reasons,  the  U.S.  Treasury  acting  as  a  LLR
provided  assistance  (bailed-out)  Lockheed  ,]-gl:.),  I,lew york  City
(1975),  and  Chrysler  (1979).  See  also  Michael  D,  Bordo,  nThe
Lender  of  Last  Resort:  Sone  Historical  Insights,rr  Working  paper
No.  30LL,  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  June  1999.
.  The  practice  of  providing  LLR assistance  to  insolvent  banks
is  not  limited  to  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  U,S.  Sinilar
behavior  has  been  followed  by  the  Bank  of  Canada.  Kevin  Doh'd, Itsome  Lessons  frorn  the  Recent  Canadian  Bank  Failuresr  in  George
9.  -Klaufman.,  .ed.,  Research  in  Financial  Services:  private  and
Pub1ic  Policies  (creenwich,  CT.:  Jnf  eiessl  ,  reAe,  pp.  ftf-fZS.L7
has  effectively  rnade discount  window  lendinq  part  of  the  safety
net  under  too-Iarge-to-fail  j-nstitutions.  There  is  neither
precedent  for  such  assistance  in  the  LLR  literature  nor  even  an
discussion  of  it  in  published  Federal  Reserve rnateriars.  rndeed,
in  his  testinony  before  Congress  on  the  Drexel  Burnhan  failure,
Federal  Reserve  chairrnan  Alan  Greenspan  stated  that:
Then,  as  now,  our  concern  was not  with  the  fortune  of  a
particular  finn;  rather  it  was and renains  the  orderly
operation  of  the  financial  markets,  because  that  is  a
prereguis,ite  for  the  orderly  functioning  of  the
econonv. .r''
Wn"., tt"  Fed  provides  assistance  directty  to  an  econornic
insolvent  or  near  insolvent.  but  open  institution,  it  provides
tine  for  uninsured  depositors  to  withdraw  their  funds  at  ful1
face  value.  Because the  Fed  colateralizes  its  loans  fully,  it
wiII  not  experience  losses  if  and  when  the  institution  fails.
Rather,  the  losses  are  passed on to  the  FDIC.
rnteresti-ngly,  the  Federar  Reserve  did  not  provide  LLR  assistance
to  Drexel  Burnhan  durinq  the  final  days  of  its  dernise.  In  parE,
this  nay  have  been  rnotivated  by  the  dislike  of  poricy  nakera  for
the  firm.  The  wa1l  Street  Journal  reported  that
Drexel  was  getting  its  comeuppance  and  that  didn,t  seern
to  bother  rnany  in  the  reguLatory  establishrnent.  rrThe
ol.d  Drexel  Burnham  Lanbert  that  everyone  knew  and  hated
for  the  last  LO  years  is  gonett  said  one  Bush
administration  officiil.
The  sane  article  also  quoted  FDrc  chairman  willian  seidman  as
saying  that  'iif  the  rnarket  fl_oats  through  al1  this,  then  we  have
greater  stability  than  we  had  hoped'r  (Alan  Murray  and  Kevin  c.
Salwer,  'rFed,  SEC Officials  OecidLd  Hands-Off  policy  Was  Best,rl
Wa1l  Street  Journal  ,  February  !4,  IggO,  p.  A6)
14.  Al-an  Greenspan,  rTestimony  before  the  Subconrnittee
on  Econornic  and  conmercial  Lar.r,  colnnittee  on  the  Jud j-ciaryrt
(wasbington,  D.c. ) t  Board  of  covernors  of  the  nederll
Reserve  Systen,  March  l_,  L990.18
In  sum,  LLR assistance  appears  appropriate  to  offset  shocks
that  l)threaten  to  reduce  aggregate  money supply  and  2)in  the
absence  of  a  potential  reduction  in  the  money  supply,  ignite
temporary  liquidity  probLens  that  are  1ike1y  to  produce
significant  fire-sale  losses  that  nay  be  expected  to  reduce
aggregate  income  and  nealth  temporarily  below  equilibriurn  l-evels
or  the  Levels  that  woul-d  exist  if  the  rnarkets  were  perfectlv
efficient. what  constitutes  a  sufficient  severe  licruiditv
problen  to  warrant  intervention  is  difficul-t  to  define  precisely
and,  as  is  argued  Later  in  the  paper,  reguires  a  careful  and
publicly  verifiabLe  cost-benefit  analysis.  AIso,  for  reasons
discussed  later,  there  is  a  strong  tendency  for  the  LLR  to  view
crises  as  nore  severe  than  they  actually  are  and  the  costs  of
intervention  as  smaller  than  thev  actuallv  are.
what  Is  the  cost  of  LLR Assistance
LLR assistance,  no  natter  how apparent  the  immediate  need  or
by  whom provided,  is  not  costless.  Any  governnent  assistance
that  reduces  losses  below  those  that  would  occur  as  a  resu]t  of
market  forces  in  the  absence  of  such  assistance  incurs  the  danger
of  discouraging  action  by  private  participants  to  protect
thernselves  frorn  future  narket  shocks.  Thus,  unLess  priced
correctly,  LLR  assistance  induces  moral  hazard  problens  by
encouraging  market  participants  to  alter  their  behavior  in  a  way
that  shifts  risks  to  the  LLR  and  governnent.  This  potential
hazard  has  been  described  succincity  by  Charles  Kindleberger  as19
Markets  generally  work,  but  occasionally  they  break
down.  when  they  do,  they  require  govlrnnent
intervention  to  provide  the  public  good of  s*bility..,
lButl  if  the  narkets  know  in  advance  that  heln-  is
forthcorning  under  generous  dispensations,  they  break
down nore  frequently  and  function  less  effectivelv...
This  paradox  is  equivalent  to  the  prisoner,s  dileimra.
central  banks  should  act  one  r^ray (lending  freely)  to
hal-t  the  panj.c,  but  another  (Ieave  the  mirket  to'  its
9rl  devices)  .to  improve  the  chances  of  preventing
future  panics -  15
Indeed,  tne  lotential  for  noral  hazard  was noted  as  early  as  by
Thornton,  who vrrote:
It  is  by  no  means  intended  to  imply  that  it  rrould
become the  Bank  of  England  to  retieve  every  distress
rthich  the  rashness  of  country  banks  nay  bring  upon
then:  the  bank,  by  doing  thii,  rnight  enlouraqJ  thlir
improv j,dence.  Theie  seerns to  be  a  mediurn at  which  a
publie  bank  shoul-d  ain  in  grantingr  aid  to  inferior
establishments,  and  which  it  rnust  often  find  it
difficult  to  be  observed.  The reLief  should  neither  be
so  prompt  and  liberal  as  to  exempt  those  who nisconducc
their  business  fron  all-  the  nitural  consequences  of
their  fau1t,  nor  so  scanty  and  slohr  as 
-deeply 
to
involve  the  general  interlsts,  These  interests,
nevertheless,  are  sure  to  be  pleaded  by  every
distressed  person  whose  affairs  are  .l-arqe,  however
indifferent  or  even ruinous  nay  be  their  st;te.16
The  decision  whether  to  provide  LLR assistance  and  at  what
price  involves  an  economic  cost-benefit  analysis.  The  benefits
have  been  described  earrier  and  are  both  irnmediate  and  obvious.
The  costs  are  delayed  and  thus  more  likely  both  not  to  be
perceived  to  be  associated  with  the  earrier  and  removecl  LLR
follows:
l_5.  Charles
Crashes  (Ne$/ York:
P.  Kindleberger,  Manias,  panics  and
Basic  Books),  L97A, pp,  6,  163.
l-6.  Henry  Thornton,  An  Enquiry  into  the  Nature  and
Effgets_  of  the  paoer  Credit  of  erea€  eritian,  fL802)  (New
York:  Farrar  and Rinehart)  1939 p.  l_88  FN.20
action  and  to  be  nore  diffuse  and  difficult  to  neasure.  For
example,  LLR  provision  of  liquidity  to  prevent  fire-sale  Losses
in  a  particular  sector  at  a  price  belos/  that  the  private  rnarket
would  charge  is  unl j_kely  to  encourage  market  participants  in  that
sector  to  inprove  the  rnechanisms  for  achieving  increased
liquidity  through  private  means. As  a  resul.t,  the  LLR  is  more
likely  to  be  required  to  provide  assistance  again  in  the  future
and  the  sector  is  effectively  being  subsidized  by  being  perrnitted
to  operate  less  efficiently  than  otherqrise.  Moreover/  in  the
process,  participants  are  encouraged  to  assume  greater  risk
exposure  than  they  would  if  they  had  to  absorb  the  fu11  share  of
the  losses.
Similarly,  assistance  to econonically  insolvent  banks
encourages  the  banks  to  increase  their  own risk  exposures  as  they
have  Little  if  any  of  their  own  shareholder  funds  at  risk,
discouraqes  other  banks  frorn  reducing  their  risk  exposures,  and
frequentLy  provides  sufficient  tirne  for  uninsured  depositors  to
shift  their  funds  elsewhere  at  full  par  value  before  the  bank  is
declared  legalLy  insolvent  and  the  value  of  their  deposits  is
reduced.  Any  Loss  frorn  such  resolution  delays  is  borne  by  the
FDIC and  the  taxpayer.  Thus,  the  costs  of  potential  future  LLR
intervention  are  substantially  larger  than  the  costs  of  current
intervention.  But,  the  discount  rate  used by  policy  makers,  who
are  under  considerabLe  political  pressure  to  optirnize  economic
performance  in  the  short-terrn  and  whose  tern  of  office  is
relatively  short  and  not  guaranteed  to  last  until  the  nexr2L
crisj.s,  is  tikeJ.y  to  be  overestimated,  so  that  the  present  value
of  the  current  benefits  of  intervention  are  likery  to  be  found
greater  than  the  present  value  of  the  future  costs.  As a  result,
the  benefit  of  any  doubts  will  be  resolved  j.n  favor  of  current
intervention.  In  the  words  of  Kindleberger:
Actuality  inevitably  dorninates contingency.  Today wins
over  tonorrow.  r,
LLR  intervention  by  the  central.  bank  nay  be  provided  in
either  of  two  hrays,  1)through  the  discount  window  and  2)through
open  rnarket  operations.  The  di,scount  window  has  been  the
traditional  neans  of  providing  Lr.R assistance  both  because  it  was
the  major  tool  of  central  banking  before  the  developnent  of  broad
financial  narkets  that  pemitted  open  narket  operations  to  be
conducted  and  because  it  could  direct  the  assistance  more
precisely  to  the  particular  sector  under  pressure,  As  financial
markets  developed  in  breadth  and  resiliency,  not  only  did  open
market  operations  preenpt  the  discount  nindow  as  the  najor  tool
of  policy,  but  they  reduced  the  need  for  the  central  bank  to
direct  its  actions  at  particular  sectors  as  the  rnarket  could  nort
direct  funds  made  avaitable  anywhere  in  the  systen  to  the
affected  sector  efficiently.  The  Federal  Reserve  appears  to  have
recognized  these  changes  in  its  "Reappraisal  of  the  Federal
Reserve  Discount  Mechanismrr  study  when  it  concluded  that:
r7.  Kindleberger,  p.  163,22
Under  present  conditions,  sophisticated  open  market
operations  enable  the  System  to  head  oif  general
liquidi.ty  crisis,  but  such  operations  .16  Iess
appropriate  when  the  systen  is  conironted  with  serious
financial  strains  anong individual  firrns  or  specialized
groups  of  institutions...  Tt  is  in  connection  with
these  linited  crisis  that  the  discount  windoq^can  play
an effective  role  as  ,lender  of  last  resortr.lS
Recent  Federal  Reserve  operations  that  rnay be  classified  as
LLR  intervention  appear  to  have  been  divided  bethreen  open  narket
and  discount  window assistance  in  line  with  the  Fed,s  statenent.
Assi.stance  was  provided  primariry  through  the  discount  wi-ndow in
the  Franklin  Nationar  Bank  (r.974),  the  continentar  rlr.inois  Bank
(1984),  the  Texas  banks  (1992-89)  and  the  Bank of  New England
(l-990)  failures  and through  open narket  operations  in  the  october
1987 and r-989 stock  rnarket  breaks.19  This  division  may have been
detennined  at  least  in  part  by  a  recognition  of  the  probabJ.e
insorvency  of  the  banks  and the  unrikelihood  that  funds  wouLd be
directed  to  them  by  the  private  narket.  Unlike  the  FDIC,  the
Federal  Reserve  is  in  an  enviabLe  position  as  a  LLR,  As  noted
earlier,  because  it  reguires  full  narket  varue  col ]ateral  i z  at.ron
of  its  discount  window J.oans, it  can  rend  freety  to  econornically
insolvent  banks,  if  it  so  wishes,  without  fear  of  suffering
losses.  Any  loss  i-s  shifted  to  the  FDrc  and,  if  sufficientlv
L8. Board  of  Governors of  the Federal  Reserve  System,
(Wash n,  D.C.  ) ,  L968.  P.
19.  In  the  Penn Central  failure  (L970)  the  Fed  announced
its  intentions  to  provide  liquidity  if  necessary,  but  apparentl-y
did  not  have  to  do  so.  tfris  ls  consisten€'  with  iiteirot,-
strategy.23
Iarge,  to  the  taxpayer.  This  moraf  hazard  problen  can be  reduced
by  requiring  the  Fed  to  obtain  perrnission  fron  the  FDIC  before
extending  emergency  assistance  through  the  discount  window.2o
Reliance  on  open  narket  operations  to  provide  assistance
also  reduces  the  political  pressures  on  the  LLR  to  assist  all
entities  in  financial  distress,  in  particular,  financially  weak
but  politically  strong  entities,  e.qt.,  conmercial.  banks,  directly
through  the  discount  Lrindow.  The private  market  is  less  likely
to  direct  additional-  funds  provided  by  open  narket  operations  to
such entities,
Lastly,  open  market  operations  elirninate  the  need  to  price
LLR assistance  correctly.  By definition,  funds  provided  through
open  market  operations  are  priced  at  the  current  market  rate  for
the  particular  securities  involved.  In  contrast,  funds  provided
through  the  discount  window  need  to  be  priced  adninistrat  ively
and,  if  priced  incorrectly,  may reduce  the  effectiveness  of  the
assistance.  If  the  discount  rate  charged  is  too  low,  too  much
assistance  is  J.ikery  to  be  provided  uith  resurting  subsidies  and
encouragement  to  risk  taking.  If  the  discount  rate  is  too  high,
insufficient,  assistance  is  likely  to  be  provided.  Identifying
the  correct  price  is,  however,  not  an  easy  task  and  unlikely  to
be  achieved  at  all  tirnes.  As  noted  earl  j.er,  many students  of  LLR
intervention  have  suggested  that  the  assistance  be  provided  at  a
"penaltyrr  rate  to  avoid  underpricing,  discourage  undue  use,  and
cornpensate  for  the  risk  premiun  that  the  narket  assigns  to  such
20.  George J.  Benston.  et  al-.,  Chapt.  5.24
funding.  But  ttpenaltyrr  rate  is  by  necessity  an  irnpreeise  concept
that  is  as  likely  to  be  rnispriced  as  priced  correctly.  This
reduces  the  usefulness  of  Bagehot,s  rule  to  lend  freely,  but  at  a
high  (penalty)  rate.  Thus,  open market  operations  appear  to  be
more effici.ent  way of  providing  LLR assistance.
only  if  the  central  bank  had  superior  or  more  tirnely
information  about  the  nature  of  the  crisis  or  the  participants
invol-ved  than  the  market  does,  should  provi_ding  assistance
through  the  discount  window  dorninate  open  market  operations.
Because  it  is  unJ.ikely  that  the  Federal  Reserve  has  such
knowledge  at  all  or  even  nost  of  the  tine,  providing  LLR
assistance  through  the  discount  window should  be  lirnited  to  rare
occasions.  Moreover,  the  LLR may not  fi-nd  it  easy,  particularly
on  short  notice,  to  differentiate  between  good  and  bad  security
or  solvent  and  insoLvent  banks.  Thus,  open  narket  operations
arso  rnake it  unnecessary  to  worry  not  only  about  the  correct  rate
to  charge  but  also  about  the  correct  borrowers  to  r.rhon to  lend,
in  particular,  about  providing  assistance  to  those  experiencing
the  initia]  shock,  who  nay  be  expected  to  exert  the  greatest
pressures  on  the  LLF,.
Summary and  Conclusion
This  paper  has  argued  that
has  changed  substantially  since
early  1800s.  In  large  part,
the  concept  of  LLR  intervention
its  original  developrnent  in  the
this  change  has  reflected  the
changes  in  the  economic  structure  in  the  intervening  years.  Thischange  in  the  appropriate  role  for  the  Lr,R has  not  been  furry
appreciated  by  nany  analysts. The  justification  for  LLR
intervention  has  always  been  to  rninimize,  if  not  prevent,  the
effects  of  financial  crises  on rear.  incone  and f ever.s of  economic
activity.  It  hras  and  is  vj,ewed  as  ternporary  separate  from
central  bank  operations  to  influence  incorne,  enployrnent,  ancl
prj.ce  through  time.  In  the  early  days,  adverse  shocks  to  the
economy were  likely  to  spi]l  over  to  initially  unaffected  sectors
and  potentially  the  econony  as  a  whole  through  reductions  in  the
noney  suppLy, Thus,  early  analysts  gave  heavy  !,reight  in
justifying  LLR  intervention  to  the  protection  of  the  money
supply.  But  since  the  abandonment  of  specie_based  money  and
Iater  the  introduction  of  federal  deposit  insurance,  colLapses  of
the  money  supply  have  become hiqhly  un1ike1y.
The  second  reason  for  LLR  intervention  r{ras  to  offset
temporary  liquidity  strai_ns  fron  adverse  shocks  that  induced
large  nunber  of  rnarket  participants  to  reassess  quickly  their
asset  portfolios  and  ser.r,  sorne assets  without  a  concurrent  threat
to  the  noney  suppLy.  If  the  trading  rnechanics  of  the  particular
rnarket  were  not  sufficiently  efficient,  fire-sa1e  r.osses  wourd  be
incurred  that  lrould  temporarily  depress  aggregate  real  incone  and
serve  no  lasting  social  or  econornic  purpose.  As  Bagehot  noted
Iong  ago,  the  LLR  could  prevent  these  by  providing  additional
funds  freely.  This  reason  rernains  valid  today  and  justifies  LLR
assistance  such  as  was  provided  in  response  to  the  October  1987
stock  market  break.  It  is,  hoi.rever,  irnportant  to  note  that  the26
LLR should  attenpt  to  offset  onry  the  potential  fire-sare  losses
associated  with  an  adverse  shock,  not  the  adverse  income  effects
of  the  shock  itself.  As  is  r.iell  recognized,  monetary  actions  can
at  best  affect  reaL  incorne  only  rnarginally  and  tenporarity.
Likewise,  assistance  to  insolvent  banks  and  other  individual
entities  directl.y  is  inappropriate  and  inefficient,  SoJ.vency
problens  should  not  be  hidden  under  the  cl-oak  of  liquidity
problens,
To  reduce  problems  of  correctly  pricing  the  assistance,
providing  assistance  to  equilibri_um  insoLvent  institutions,  and
succunbing  to  political  pressures  to  direct  assistance  to  special
institutions,  LLR assistance,  if  provided  by  the  Federal  Reserve,
shouLd  be  provided  through  open  market  operations,  Only  1f  the
Federal  Reserve  can  clearly  demonstrate  that  it  has  superior
information  than  the  rnarket  should  assistance  be  provided  through
the  discount  window and then  only  after  receiving  pernission  fron
the  FDIC,  the  ultirnate  bearer  of  any  losses,  to  reduce  the  noral
hazard  probl,em.  LLR  assistance  through  the  discount  window
should  be  viewed  as  an  integral  part  of  the  federal_  safety  net
aLong with  deposit  insurance.
LLR  assistance  to  offset  liguidity  strains  cannot  be
justified  solely  on  the  basis  of  an  actuaL  or  perceived  crisis.
If  it  is  not  priced  correctly,  such assistance  can cause the  same
kinds  of  mora]  hazard  problens  as  federal  deposit  insurance  has
in  recent  years  with  sirnilar  high  costs  to  society.  The
beneficiaries  of  the  assistance  nay  be  encouraged  not  to  improve27
the  efficiency  of  the  narket  to  avoid  sirniLar  future  liquidity
crisis,  rather  than  to  protect  thenselves  from  suffering  fire-
sale  losses.  Indeed,  they  are  }ikely  to  assune  greater  risk  as
any  10sses  wirr  be  borne  by  others.  rn  the  case  of  i.nsolvent
banks,  the  assistance  also  provides  tine  for  uninsured  depositors
to  fl-ee  unscathed.  Thus,  LLR  assistance  either  through  open
market  operations  or  the  discount  window  should  be  required  to  be
justified  by  a  comprehensive  and  reproducible  benefiE-cosr
analysis  before  it  is  provj-ded,  possibly  reviewed  for  approvaL by
an  independent  body,  such as  the  ceneral  Accounting  Office.
Because  shocks  general-1y  do  not  announce  thenselves  in
advance,  contingency  analyses  for  different  types  of  shocks
should  be  prepared  and  approved  before  hand.  LLR  assistance
would  then  be  linited  to  instances  $rhere  the  present  value
benefits  of  intervention  outweighs  the  present  value  costs.  To
the  extant  cost/benefit  analysis  presentLy  is  nore  an  art  than  a
science,  the  justification  for  the  tirning  and  magnitude  of  LLR
intervention  will  remain  relatively  imprecise.  But  it  is  in  the
best  longer-run  interests  of  both  the  LLR and  the  economy if  the
rules  could  be  specified  as  precisely  as  possible,  naintained  at
aII  times,  and publicized  widety.z6
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